Date HYPERLINK “http://admin.uvocorp.com/traceitback/index.php?match=n&group=x&process=1&id=1408765&fid=2327493&type=o&get_file_content=1&submit=Go” l “back_999900_9″Turkey Relations
In the consociation model, conflicts are avoided or resolved by granting autonomy and acknowledging separate group rights within federations or confederations of different ethnic groups that are territorially separated. In the integrative model, however, since no territorial division between the ethnic groups exists, the system tries to avoid or resolve conflicts by creating non-communal federal structures or a unitary state where ethnically blind public policies are designed in the majority-but-integrated branches of the state. The Anna Plan allows for good conflict-regulation practices. The Plan grants a high degree of autonomy to each constituent state by creating con-federal arrangements within a bi-communal federation which will be based on a territorial division of power. As for state-ethnic community relations, the federal government is not superior to the constituent state and the relations between the constituent states are based on political equality. In terms of decision rules, the Annan Plan provides proportional representation and consensus rule in two of the branches of power – executive and legislative – as well as for administrative decision-making. In addition, the two constituent states elect their own separate personnel for all of the political posts of the United Cyprus Republic except the joint list for the Presidential Council. As the above evaluation shows, the Annan Plan provides the basic elements of power-sharing and the conflict-regulation practices of a consociation model, which is more suitable for the Cyprus conflict than the integrative model. The 1959 London and Zurich Agreement established a consociation democracy in Cyprus. However, the 1960 Republic of Cyprus failed to last more than three years. From that point henceforth, the two sides that were not agreeing have never reconciled. Most recently, the Annan Plan proposed the creation of a consociation federation/confederation in accordance with the most popular interpretation of the concept of self-determination: participation of different ethnic groups in democratic governance within the same federal state. They understand that the alternative is the current status quo, which mostly hurt the Turkish Cypriot community but nonetheless has affected both sides negatively. If a solution based on the Annan Plan is reached before the accession of Cyprus to the EU in May 2004 – that is, the Treaty of Accession is to be ratified in may 2004 and the United Cyprus Republic will become an EU member – the EU itself, together with its institutions and norms, will provide another umbrella under which the two Cypriot communities can cooperate peacefully. Such arrangements with the EU as well promote integration among the members. The peaceful Cyprus conflict’s resolution will contribute positively to both EU and Turkey-Greece. It is through the resolution that the broken ties between the parties are rectified and better cooperation achieved. Some of the constitutional reforms proposed by the elites and particularly connected to the function of National Security Council. The Security Council is concerned with correction of the wrongdoers.
However, the opposite is also true: the EU can play an instrumental role in resolving the Cyprus conflict in line with Annan Plan through linkage politics. If the EU gives a clear signal to Turkey that it will start the accession talks if the Turkish side would endorses the Annan Plan, then it is probable that the Turkish side would accept the Annan Plan, and then it is probable that the Turkish side would accept the Annan Plan as a solution to the Cyprus conflict. In the same vein, if the EU signals to the Greek Cypriot leadership that it should accept the Plan or face difficulties in attaining EU membership, it would be very difficult for the Greek side to spoil the Plan. We believe that in terms of the Turkish political elite’s perceptions of EU membership and Turkey’s position in the EU’s enlargement process the findings of this contribution will shed light on Turkey’s negotiations with the EU and its future prospects. Specifically, should the results indicate a lack of consensus regarding Turkey’s accession to the EU or a lack of acceptance of the potential problems that must first be resolved this will not bode well for Turkey’s future EU membership. All the differences between the two have to be solved minus which no cooperation proceeds and so the essentiality of the conflict resolution prior to any engagements. The reform must be made in order to meet the EU’s expectations and requirements. This is another factor that contributes to the success of the project. If there is no consensus regarding EU membership in the first place it will be quite difficult for the government to continue pushing through the necessary changes in the TBMM. Similarly, results indicating a lack of understanding among the deputies concerning the significance of Cyprus in Turkey’s relations with the EU – or no willingness to concede that there is a problem in Cyprus – would not be bode well for generating a domestic consensus on its resolution, even though the resolution of the Cyprus conflict is not part of the Copenhagen criteria. Thus we believe an analysis of the attitudes of the Turkish political elite is important in order to assess the nature of Turkey’s negotiations with the EU and its impacts on both parties as well as the weaknesses. Turkey’s relations with the EU have been an integral part of its foreign policy since the end of the 1950s and gained significant momentum in the 1990s with the EU’s enlargement process. Although Turkish EU relations date back to the 1950s, until quite recently very little has been known about Turkish public opinion regarding the European Union and, even with the conducting of public opinion polls on attitudes toward the EU within the last year, there has not been much focus on elite opinions. On the other hand, Turkish political leaders themselves do not seem to have a proper understanding of what EU membership entails. For example, Ecevit’s perception of the EC in the 1970s and Ozal’s in the 1980s seem to be based solely on economic terms, most probably underestimating the political dynamics of European integration. A few things, though, have been learned about non-political elites through a survey conducted by McLaren in 2000 with business people, journalists, academics and bureaucrats. The results of that study indicate considerably favorable attitudes towards Turkey’s potential EU membership as well as hope that it will indeed occur in the relatively near future. However, those in the position of law and policymaking regarding Turkey’s adoption of the acquired have not yet been interviewed to assess their opinions on Turkish-EU relations. This can be regarded as one of the weaknesses of the study as it leaves some areas untouched.
The objectives of the EU’s enlargement policy are to support the democratization process and to facilitate economic and institutional reforms in applicant countries, which are all necessary for the stability of Europe. Therefore the EU has guided, catalyzed, and even directed the process of political, economic, legal and social reform in the applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe by offering them a clear prospect of membership and an accession. Indeed, by offering economic and political benefits through pre-accession strategies and by stipulating membership requirements, the UE has greatly influenced the domestic policy choices in these applicant states; this has allowed it to affect even permanent institution building, and to encourage specific political and legal reforms in these countries. However, the EU has been reluctant to apply the same enlargement policy instruments and accession commitment to Turkey. Although Turkey’s failure to undertake the necessary policy reforms to meet requirements for EU membership has provided some grounds for the latter’s hesitation towards Turkey’s membership, it cannot provide sufficient reasons why Turkey has been treated differently from the other applicant countries as they have a similar problems. Therefore, this study argues that Turkey has been treated differently, compared to other applicant countries for EU membership. Furthermore, the study shows that the EU’s containment policy towards Turkey has lacked the clarity and certainty that would have best encouraged and facilitated Turkey’s efforts to adjust its policies to make them compatible with EU membership. As a result, the EU’s role in hastening Turkey’s attempts to align her political, economic and social system with EU norms has been less effective than it might have been and, indeed, has been in other applicant countries in similar situation.
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